With high roads, and low roads, and even a turn around now and then. Bumps and divots, and a rock or two we have come to expect.
I wish now that I had paid more attention in my history classes and had a better understanding of human nature. I find that I am having to do a lot of research to refresh my memory on our attempts to go to space and why we haven't done more.
I have a ways to go before I grasp what has taken place or attempt to guess where we will end up. I thought I might share some of the sources I have been looking at and let you reflect on our space history as well.
- LRK -
The first two are by G. Ryan Faith -LRK -
[G. Ryan Faith is an independent technology consultant and Adjunct Fellow for Space Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (CSIS). CSIS is a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. CSIS’ research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and
conclusions expressed here publication should be understood to be solely those of the author.]
---------------------------------------------
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1610/1
President Obama’s Vision for Space Exploration
by G. Ryan Faith
Monday, April 19, 2010
President Obama’s April 15th rollout of a new direction for the American space effort has elicited reactions ranging from Elon Musk’s praise for “an ambitious and exciting new plan that will alter our destiny as a species” to a letter from Neil Armstrong, Jim Lovell, and Gene Cernan warning that this new policy “destines our nation to become one of second or even third rate stature.” However, much like the discussion immediately following the 2004 unveiling of the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE)—before NASA’s release of its plan to implement national policy, the Constellation program/Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS)—the value of this new policy won’t be fully apparent until more details about implementation are available for public discussion.
It is important to note that Presidential space policies generally lack very specific budgets, mission architectures, and especially technical details, and the devils in any space policy inevitably lie in the details. Had the Space Shuttle been able to perform as originally planned, or had Space Station Freedom been built on time with all of its capabilities intact, or had the National Aerospace Plane, DC-X, VentureStar, or any one of a host of other vehicles become operational, we would be looking at a very different space exploration environment today. Nonetheless, there are a few elements in the new Presidential policy that open up a number of interesting opportunities.
This piece—the first of two parts—discusses implications of this new policy’s guidance on crew transportation and heavy lift. The second part of the article will discuss other elements of President Obama’s new policy regarding political sustainability, international cooperation, and other policy implications.
snip
---------------------------------------------
Part 2. - LRK -
---------------------------------------------
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1616/1
President Obama’s Vision for Space Exploration (part 2)
by G. Ryan Faith
Monday, April 26, 2010
On April 15th President Obama outlined the administration’s new plan for civil space exploration in a speech at the Kennedy Space Center. This article is part 2 of an analysis of the President’s announcement. The first part of the analysis discussed the cancellation and modification of the previous crew and cargo transportation efforts and the extent to which these changes represent a fundamental shift in the US approach to civil space exploration.
President Obama’s new policy reflects the findings of the Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee (also known as the Augustine Committee). The Augustine Committee found that the Constellation program was over budget and behind schedule, although the extent to which this is either a result of underfunding and the normal teething pains associated high technology procurement, or is symptomatic of poor technological decisions, is beyond the scope of this article. What is clear is that interactions among the White House, Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and NASA tightened the program’s time and cost constraints, making it ultimately unsustainable politically and programmatically. Although President Obama’s new plan represents a sharp departure from the Constellation program, begun under the previous administration, the new policy follows much of the same thinking that appears in President Bush’s 2004 Vision for Space Exploration.
On April 15th President Obama outlined the administration’s new plan for civil space exploration in a speech at the Kennedy Space Center. This article is part 2 of an analysis of the President’s announcement. The first part of the analysis discussed the cancellation and modification of the previous crew and cargo transportation efforts and the extent to which these changes represent a fundamental shift in the US approach to civil space exploration.
President Obama’s new policy reflects the findings of the Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee (also known as the Augustine Committee). The Augustine Committee found that the Constellation program was over budget and behind schedule, although the extent to which this is either a result of underfunding and the normal teething pains associated high technology procurement, or is symptomatic of poor technological decisions, is beyond the scope of this article. What is clear is that interactions among the White House, Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and NASA tightened the program’s time and cost constraints, making it ultimately unsustainable politically and programmatically. Although President Obama’s new plan represents a sharp departure from the Constellation program, begun under the previous administration, the new policy follows much of the same thinking that appears in President Bush’s 2004 Vision for Space Exploration.
snip
---------------------------------------------
There are many links to what is happening now but I needed to look at some of what went on before or was said was going to happen, and a bumpy road it was. A look at SEI seemed to be a place to start.
I was recently in Washington, D.C. and stood on the steps of the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum and inside looked at a real lunar module, the second one built for the Apollo program.
http://www.nasm.si.edu/exhibitions/gal112/
- LRK -
President George Bush stood on those steps and made his SEI announcement.
- LRK -
---------------------------------------------
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=712&year=1989&month=all
Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon Landing --- 1989-07-20
Thank you all very, very much. And thank you, Mr. Vice President, for your introduction and for undertaking to head the National Space Council and for already demonstrating your skill for leadership there. And thanks to all of you, who have braved the weather to join us today.
Behind me stands one of the most visited places on Earth, a symbol of American courage and ingenuity. And before me stand those on whose shoulders this legacy was built: the men and women of the United States astronaut corps. And we are very proud to be part of this unprecedented gathering of America's space veterans and to share this stage with three of the greatest heroes of this or any other century: the crew of Apollo 11.
It's hard to believe that 20 years have passed. Neil [Armstrong] and Buzz [Aldrin], who originated the moonwalk 15 years before Michael Jackson ever even thought of it. [Laughter] And Michael Collins, former director of this amazing museum and the brave pilot who flew alone on the dark side of the Moon while Neil and Buzz touched down -- Mike, you must be the only American over age 10 that night who didn't get to see the Moon landing. [Laughter]
snip
So, today is not only an occasion to thank these astronauts and their colleagues -- the thousands of talented men and women across the country whose commitment, creativity, and courage brought this dream to life -- it's also a time to thank the American people for their faith, because Apollo's success was made possible by the drive and daring of an entire nation committed to a dream.
In the building behind me are the testaments to Apollo and to what came before -- the chariots of fire flown by Armstrong, Yeager, Lindbergh, and the Wrights. And in the National Archives, across the great expanse of grass, are preserved the founding documents of the idea that made it all possible -- the world's greatest experiment in freedom and diversity. And here, standing between these twin legacies, is a fitting place to look forward to the future, because the Apollo astronauts left more than flags and footprints on the Moon; they also left some unfinished business. For even 20 years ago, we recognized that America's ultimate goal was not simply to go there and go back, but to go there and go on. Mike Collins said it best: ``The Moon is not a destination; it's a direction.''
snip
In 1961 it took a crisis -- the space race -- to speed things up. Today we don't have a crisis; we have an opportunity. To seize this opportunity, I'm not proposing a 10-year plan like Apollo; I'm proposing a long-range, continuing commitment. First, for the coming decade, for the 1990's: Space Station Freedom, our critical next step in all our space endeavors. And next, for the new century: Back to the Moon; back to the future. And this time, back to stay. And then a journey into tomorrow, a journey to another planet: a manned mission to Mars.
Each mission should and will lay the groundwork for the next. And the pathway to the stars begins, as it did 20 years ago, with you, the American people. And it continues just up the street there, to the United States Congress, where the future of the space station and our future as a spacefaring nation will be decided.
snip
---------------------------------------------
Well, it was decided by the United States Congress, NOT to 'go back to the Moon, this time to stay.'
It turns out there is more to getting programs funded than to just declare that they should take place.
I need more understanding of how politics works and I have just been one of those guys that likes to tinker.
I really have not been interested in money or getting projects funded.
I guess that is why I am not the CEO of Rocket Company.
- LRK -
And then there were the studies to determine what was to be done and when the cost estimates, right or wrong, came in, SEI was dead. There are a lot of paths here and some throwing of stones, and leaving items for you to trip over. Makes for an interesting story, but one with a sad ending.
- LRK -
---------------------------------------------
http://history.nasa.gov/seisummary.htm
Summary of Space Exploration Initiative
By: Steve Dick, NASA Chief Historian
On July 20, 1989 President George H. W. Bush announced plans for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI). On the 20th anniversary of the Apollo 11 lunar landing mission, Bush delivered a speech on the steps of the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum calling for construction of the Space Station Freedom, sending humans back to the Moon, and ultimately sending astronauts to Mars. In announcing his plans Bush specifically invoked history and exploration: “From the voyages of Columbus – to the Oregon Trail – to the journey to the Moon itself – history proves that we have never lost by pressing the limits of our frontiers.” He noted that in 1961 it took a crisis to accelerate the civilian space program, and that he was acting in 1989 not impelled by crisis but to seize an opportunity in the best tradition of American history. He proposed not a 10-year Apollo-style plan, but a long-range continuing commitment based on the three above elements, ending with “a journey into tomorrow – a journey to another planet – a manned mission to Mars.” The President noted it was humanity’s destiny to explore, and America’s destiny to lead. He ended by asking Vice President Quayle to lead the National Space Council in determining what was needed to carry out these missions in terms of money, manpower and technology.
Following this announcement NASA Administrator Richard Truly initiated a study of the options to achieve the President’s goals, headed by Johnson Space Center Director Aaron Cohen. On 29 November 1989, Truly briefed the National Space Council’s Blue Ribbon Panel on the resulting “90-Day Study.” The study estimated SEI’s long-term cost at approximately 500 billion dollars, a truly staggering figure, even spread over 20 to 30 years. The Vice President asked the National Academy of Sciences to assess the scope and content of the NASA study, as well as alternative approaches and technology issues. Although the Academy largely concurred with the NASA study, White House and Congressional reaction to the NASA plan was hostile, primarily due to the cost estimate. NASA was repeatedly rebuffed in its efforts to gain Congressional support for the plan. President Bush sought international partners, but the program was too expensive even for an international endeavor.
In August 1990 President Bush established a Committee, headed by Norm Augustine, to make recommendations for the space program. Among the recommendations in the Augustine report, released on 17 December, 1990, was that NASA should focus on space and Earth science, while
transitioning human exploration to a “go-as-you-pay” strategy. The President ordered NASA implement these recommendations. Dan Goldin was brought in as the new NASA Administrator, and during his tenure near-term human exploration beyond Earth orbit was abandoned, and the “faster, better, cheaper” strategy was applied to space science robotic exploration. As a result the Clinton Administration’s 1996 National Space Policy officially removed human exploration from the national agenda.
snip
---------------------------------------------
A November 1989 90-Day Study that is 159 pages long. Lots of ideas, drawings and plans for a space station, going to the Moon, and to Mars.
- LRK -
---------------------------------------------
http://history.nasa.gov/90_day_study.pdf (11.6 MB)
NASA Moon/Mars Database Report
This is an internal NASA report prepared for NASA Administrator Truly by a team led by Johnson Space Center Director Aaron Cohen. It was commissioned by Admiral Truly after the President's July 20 speech, and its purpose is to provide a database for the Space Council to refer to as it considers strategic planning issues.
The report will be used as an input and one data source for Council consideration of approaches to program, schedule and technology, international cooperation and management.
The Space Council will examine the reference.cases described in the report and also intends to examine a range Of robust technical alternatives and approaches to mission planning°
The report does not contain any specific recommendations.
The report does not contain any estimates of total mission cost.
The report provides information regarding the potential benefits of the human exploration initiative, international, participation considerations, and potential management system enhancements.
snip
---------------------------------------------
And here is a July 1991 study by International Security and Commerce Program, Office of Technology Assessment that is 112 pages long. (and my eyes are getting tired reading, wish I was younger.)
- LRK -
---------------------------------------------
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/32992.pdf (2.7 MB)
Exploring the Moon and Mars: Choices for the Nation
July 1991
OTA-ISC-502
Foreword
The United States has always been at the forefront of exploring the planets. U.S. spacecraft have now journeyed near every planet in the solar system but Pluto, the most distant one. Its probes have also landed on the Moon and Mars. Magellan, the most recent of U.S. interplanetary voyagers, has been returning thought-provoking, high-resolution radar images of the surface of Venus.
Scientifically, the prospect of returning to the Moon and exploring Mars in greater detail is an exciting one. President George Bush’s proposal to establish a permanent lunar base and to send human crews to explore Mars is ambitious and would engage both scientists and engineers in challenging tasks. Yet it also raises a host of issues regarding the appropriate mix of humans and machines, timeliness, and costs of space exploration. This Nation faces a sobering variety of economic, environmental, and technological challenges over the next few decades, all of which will make major demands on the Federal budget and other national assets. Within this context, Congress will have to decide the appropriate pace and direction for the President’s space exploration proposal.
This report, the result of an assessment of the potential for automation and robotics technology to assist in the exploration of the Moon and Mars, raises a number of issues related to the goals of the U.S. civilian space program. Among other things, the report discusses how greater attention to automation and robotics technologies could contribute to U.S. space exploration efforts.
In undertaking this report, OTA sought the contributions of a broad spectrum of knowledgeable individuals and organizations. Some provided information, others reviewed drafts. OTA gratefully acknowledges their contributions of time and intellectual effort.
NTIS order #PB91-220046
snip
---------------------------------------------
Here is a reference that is helping me understand what goes on in picking what NASA does or does not do, concerning our quest for becoming adept at living in space and exploring other astronomical bodies. There are a number of references listed and I have ordered a couple of books to add to the ones already on my coffee table. I don't think it will help my sore jaw from gritting my teeth.
- LRK -
For now, the next reference should round out my understanding.
- LRK -
---------------------------------------------
Mars wars : the rise and fall of the Space Exploration Initiative /.
Thor Hogan. p. cm. -- (The NASA history series) (NASA SP-2007-4410)
...
history.nasa.gov/sp4410.pdf (107 p. 2.52 MB)
snip
---------------------------------------------
Thor Hogan makes reference a number of times to what David S. F. Portree has compiled in his Monograph 21 David covers a lot of those paths that we tried to follow.
- LRK -
---------------------------------------------
http://history.nasa.gov/monograph21/humans_to_Mars.htm
Humans to Mars
Humans to Mars: Fifty Years of Mission Planning, 1950-2000 (NASA SP-2001-4521) by David S. F. Portree. A complete PDF version of Monograph 21.
http://history.nasa.gov/monograph21.pdf
Humans to Mars is also available to be downloaded by chapter. The low-res version is best for Web viewing. The hi-res version is best for printing.
snip
---------------------------------------------
Please don't shoot the messenger.
There is a lot of information available and often numbers are thrown around without a reference to what they mean or the background that surrounds them, like $300B - $500B to go the Moon, or was that to the Moon, Mars and for a space station. Was it for a 10 year or 20 year or a 30 year time span?
And today, when you add up what NASA is going to be getting a year, what would that number equate to if you said it was for 10, 20, or 30 years?
---------------------------------------------
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet_department_nasa/
FY2011 Request: $19.0 billion
FY2010 Enacted: $18.3 billion
---------------------------------------------
And when we pick our path to space are we going to try to walk all of them at once, or will we take a journey that has a goal with a number of stops along the way? How many times will we get lost and find we are back to where we started before? Do we have a limited budget that constrains us to be efficient in our selections or do we have a patron saint that will leave sacs of coins along the way? Do I have to produce something to earn my keep or can I pick and chose what I want and take as much as I want?
All those questions and more when you start looking at the details and packing your bag. :-)
Thanks for looking up with me.
- LRK -
Web Site: http://lkellogg.vttoth.com/LarryRussellKellogg/
BlogSpot: http://kelloggserialreports.blogspot.com/
Newsletter: https://news.altair.com/mailman/listinfo/lunar-update
============================================
WHAT THE MIND CAN CONCEIVE, AND BELIEVE, IT WILL ACHIEVE - LRK
============================================
President Obama’s Vision for Space Exploration
by G. Ryan Faith
Monday, April 19, 2010
President Obama’s April 15th rollout of a new direction for the American space effort has elicited reactions ranging from Elon Musk’s praise for “an ambitious and exciting new plan that will alter our destiny as a species” to a letter from Neil Armstrong, Jim Lovell, and Gene Cernan warning that this new policy “destines our nation to become one of second or even third rate stature.” However, much like the discussion immediately following the 2004 unveiling of the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE)—before NASA’s release of its plan to implement national policy, the Constellation program/Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS)—the value of this new policy won’t be fully apparent until more details about implementation are available for public discussion.
It is important to note that Presidential space policies generally lack very specific budgets, mission architectures, and especially technical details, and the devils in any space policy inevitably lie in the details. Had the Space Shuttle been able to perform as originally planned, or had Space Station Freedom been built on time with all of its capabilities intact, or had the National Aerospace Plane, DC-X, VentureStar, or any one of a host of other vehicles become operational, we would be looking at a very different space exploration environment today. Nonetheless, there are a few elements in the new Presidential policy that open up a number of interesting opportunities.
This piece—the first of two parts—discusses implications of this new policy’s guidance on crew transportation and heavy lift. The second part of the article will discuss other elements of President Obama’s new policy regarding political sustainability, international cooperation, and other policy implications.
snip
------------------------------
Part 2. - LRK -
------------------------------
http://www.thespacereview.com/
President Obama’s Vision for Space Exploration (part 2)
by G. Ryan Faith
Monday, April 26, 2010
On April 15th President Obama outlined the administration’s new plan for civil space exploration in a speech at the Kennedy Space Center. This article is part 2 of an analysis of the President’s announcement. The first part of the analysis discussed the cancellation and modification of the previous crew and cargo transportation efforts and the extent to which these changes represent a fundamental shift in the US approach to civil space exploration.
President Obama’s new policy reflects the findings of the Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee (also known as the Augustine Committee). The Augustine Committee found that the Constellation program was over budget and behind schedule, although the extent to which this is either a result of underfunding and the normal teething pains associated high technology procurement, or is symptomatic of poor technological decisions, is beyond the scope of this article. What is clear is that interactions among the White House, Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and NASA tightened the program’s time and cost constraints, making it ultimately unsustainable politically and programmatically. Although President Obama’s new plan represents a sharp departure from the Constellation program, begun under the previous administration, the new policy follows much of the same thinking that appears in President Bush’s 2004 Vision for Space Exploration.
On April 15th President Obama outlined the administration’s new plan for civil space exploration in a speech at the Kennedy Space Center. This article is part 2 of an analysis of the President’s announcement. The first part of the analysis discussed the cancellation and modification of the previous crew and cargo transportation efforts and the extent to which these changes represent a fundamental shift in the US approach to civil space exploration.
President Obama’s new policy reflects the findings of the Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee (also known as the Augustine Committee). The Augustine Committee found that the Constellation program was over budget and behind schedule, although the extent to which this is either a result of underfunding and the normal teething pains associated high technology procurement, or is symptomatic of poor technological decisions, is beyond the scope of this article. What is clear is that interactions among the White House, Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and NASA tightened the program’s time and cost constraints, making it ultimately unsustainable politically and programmatically. Although President Obama’s new plan represents a sharp departure from the Constellation program, begun under the previous administration, the new policy follows much of the same thinking that appears in President Bush’s 2004 Vision for Space Exploration.
snip
------------------------------
There are many links to what is happening now but I needed to look at some of what went on before or was said was going to happen, and a bumpy road it was. A look at SEI seemed to be a place to start.
I was recently in Washington, D.C. and stood on the steps of the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum and inside looked at a real lunar module, the second one built for the Apollo program.
http://www.nasm.si.edu/
- LRK -
President George Bush stood on those steps and made his SEI announcement.
- LRK -
------------------------------
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/
Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon Landing --- 1989-07-20
Thank you all very, very much. And thank you, Mr. Vice President, for your introduction and for undertaking to head the National Space Council and for already demonstrating your skill for leadership there. And thanks to all of you, who have braved the weather to join us today.
Behind me stands one of the most visited places on Earth, a symbol of American courage and ingenuity. And before me stand those on whose shoulders this legacy was built: the men and women of the United States astronaut corps. And we are very proud to be part of this unprecedented gathering of America's space veterans and to share this stage with three of the greatest heroes of this or any other century: the crew of Apollo 11.
It's hard to believe that 20 years have passed. Neil [Armstrong] and Buzz [Aldrin], who originated the moonwalk 15 years before Michael Jackson ever even thought of it. [Laughter] And Michael Collins, former director of this amazing museum and the brave pilot who flew alone on the dark side of the Moon while Neil and Buzz touched down -- Mike, you must be the only American over age 10 that night who didn't get to see the Moon landing. [Laughter]
snip
So, today is not only an occasion to thank these astronauts and their colleagues -- the thousands of talented men and women across the country whose commitment, creativity, and courage brought this dream to life -- it's also a time to thank the American people for their faith, because Apollo's success was made possible by the drive and daring of an entire nation committed to a dream.
In the building behind me are the testaments to Apollo and to what came before -- the chariots of fire flown by Armstrong, Yeager, Lindbergh, and the Wrights. And in the National Archives, across the great expanse of grass, are preserved the founding documents of the idea that made it all possible -- the world's greatest experiment in freedom and diversity. And here, standing between these twin legacies, is a fitting place to look forward to the future, because the Apollo astronauts left more than flags and footprints on the Moon; they also left some unfinished business. For even 20 years ago, we recognized that America's ultimate goal was not simply to go there and go back, but to go there and go on. Mike Collins said it best: ``The Moon is not a destination; it's a direction.''
snip
In 1961 it took a crisis -- the space race -- to speed things up. Today we don't have a crisis; we have an opportunity. To seize this opportunity, I'm not proposing a 10-year plan like Apollo; I'm proposing a long-range, continuing commitment. First, for the coming decade, for the 1990's: Space Station Freedom, our critical next step in all our space endeavors. And next, for the new century: Back to the Moon; back to the future. And this time, back to stay. And then a journey into tomorrow, a journey to another planet: a manned mission to Mars.
Each mission should and will lay the groundwork for the next. And the pathway to the stars begins, as it did 20 years ago, with you, the American people. And it continues just up the street there, to the United States Congress, where the future of the space station and our future as a spacefaring nation will be decided.
snip
------------------------------
Well, it was decided by the United States Congress, NOT to 'go back to the Moon, this time to stay.'
It turns out there is more to getting programs funded than to just declare that they should take place.
I need more understanding of how politics works and I have just been one of those guys that likes to tinker.
I really have not been interested in money or getting projects funded.
I guess that is why I am not the CEO of Rocket Company.
- LRK -
And then there were the studies to determine what was to be done and when the cost estimates, right or wrong, came in, SEI was dead. There are a lot of paths here and some throwing of stones, and leaving items for you to trip over. Makes for an interesting story, but one with a sad ending.
- LRK -
------------------------------
http://history.nasa.gov/
Summary of Space Exploration Initiative
By: Steve Dick, NASA Chief Historian
On July 20, 1989 President George H. W. Bush announced plans for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI). On the 20th anniversary of the Apollo 11 lunar landing mission, Bush delivered a speech on the steps of the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum calling for construction of the Space Station Freedom, sending humans back to the Moon, and ultimately sending astronauts to Mars. In announcing his plans Bush specifically invoked history and exploration: “From the voyages of Columbus – to the Oregon Trail – to the journey to the Moon itself – history proves that we have never lost by pressing the limits of our frontiers.” He noted that in 1961 it took a crisis to accelerate the civilian space program, and that he was acting in 1989 not impelled by crisis but to seize an opportunity in the best tradition of American history. He proposed not a 10-year Apollo-style plan, but a long-range continuing commitment based on the three above elements, ending with “a journey into tomorrow – a journey to another planet – a manned mission to Mars.” The President noted it was humanity’s destiny to explore, and America’s destiny to lead. He ended by asking Vice President Quayle to lead the National Space Council in determining what was needed to carry out these missions in terms of money, manpower and technology.
Following this announcement NASA Administrator Richard Truly initiated a study of the options to achieve the President’s goals, headed by Johnson Space Center Director Aaron Cohen. On 29 November 1989, Truly briefed the National Space Council’s Blue Ribbon Panel on the resulting “90-Day Study.” The study estimated SEI’s long-term cost at approximately 500 billion dollars, a truly staggering figure, even spread over 20 to 30 years. The Vice President asked the National Academy of Sciences to assess the scope and content of the NASA study, as well as alternative approaches and technology issues. Although the Academy largely concurred with the NASA study, White House and Congressional reaction to the NASA plan was hostile, primarily due to the cost estimate. NASA was repeatedly rebuffed in its efforts to gain Congressional support for the plan. President Bush sought international partners, but the program was too expensive even for an international endeavor.
In August 1990 President Bush established a Committee, headed by Norm Augustine, to make recommendations for the space program. Among the recommendations in the Augustine report, released on 17 December, 1990, was that NASA should focus on space and Earth science, while
transitioning human exploration to a “go-as-you-pay” strategy. The President ordered NASA implement these recommendations. Dan Goldin was brought in as the new NASA Administrator, and during his tenure near-term human exploration beyond Earth orbit was abandoned, and the “faster, better, cheaper” strategy was applied to space science robotic exploration. As a result the Clinton Administration’s 1996 National Space Policy officially removed human exploration from the national agenda.
snip
------------------------------
A November 1989 90-Day Study that is 159 pages long. Lots of ideas, drawings and plans for a space station, going to the Moon, and to Mars.
- LRK -
------------------------------
http://history.nasa.gov/90_
NASA Moon/Mars Database Report
This is an internal NASA report prepared for NASA Administrator Truly by a team led by Johnson Space Center Director Aaron Cohen. It was commissioned by Admiral Truly after the President's July 20 speech, and its purpose is to provide a database for the Space Council to refer to as it considers strategic planning issues.
The report will be used as an input and one data source for Council consideration of approaches to program, schedule and technology, international cooperation and management.
The Space Council will examine the reference.cases described in the report and also intends to examine a range Of robust technical alternatives and approaches to mission planning°
The report does not contain any specific recommendations.
The report does not contain any estimates of total mission cost.
The report provides information regarding the potential benefits of the human exploration initiative, international, participation considerations, and potential management system enhancements.
snip
------------------------------
And here is a July 1991 study by International Security and Commerce Program, Office of Technology Assessment that is 112 pages long. (and my eyes are getting tired reading, wish I was younger.)
- LRK -
------------------------------
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/
Exploring the Moon and Mars: Choices for the Nation
July 1991
OTA-ISC-502
Foreword
The United States has always been at the forefront of exploring the planets. U.S. spacecraft have now journeyed near every planet in the solar system but Pluto, the most distant one. Its probes have also landed on the Moon and Mars. Magellan, the most recent of U.S. interplanetary voyagers, has been returning thought-provoking, high-resolution radar images of the surface of Venus.
Scientifically, the prospect of returning to the Moon and exploring Mars in greater detail is an exciting one. President George Bush’s proposal to establish a permanent lunar base and to send human crews to explore Mars is ambitious and would engage both scientists and engineers in challenging tasks. Yet it also raises a host of issues regarding the appropriate mix of humans and machines, timeliness, and costs of space exploration. This Nation faces a sobering variety of economic, environmental, and technological challenges over the next few decades, all of which will make major demands on the Federal budget and other national assets. Within this context, Congress will have to decide the appropriate pace and direction for the President’s space exploration proposal.
This report, the result of an assessment of the potential for automation and robotics technology to assist in the exploration of the Moon and Mars, raises a number of issues related to the goals of the U.S. civilian space program. Among other things, the report discusses how greater attention to automation and robotics technologies could contribute to U.S. space exploration efforts.
In undertaking this report, OTA sought the contributions of a broad spectrum of knowledgeable individuals and organizations. Some provided information, others reviewed drafts. OTA gratefully acknowledges their contributions of time and intellectual effort.
NTIS order #PB91-220046
snip
------------------------------
Here is a reference that is helping me understand what goes on in picking what NASA does or does not do, concerning our quest for becoming adept at living in space and exploring other astronomical bodies. There are a number of references listed and I have ordered a couple of books to add to the ones already on my coffee table. I don't think it will help my sore jaw from gritting my teeth.
- LRK -
For now, the next reference should round out my understanding.
- LRK -
------------------------------
Mars wars : the rise and fall of the Space Exploration Initiative /.
Thor Hogan. p. cm. -- (The NASA history series) (NASA SP-2007-4410)
...
history.nasa.gov/sp4410.pdf (107 p. 2.52 MB)
snip
------------------------------
Thor Hogan makes reference a number of times to what David S. F. Portree has compiled in his Monograph 21 David covers a lot of those paths that we tried to follow.
- LRK -
------------------------------
http://history.nasa.gov/
Humans to Mars
Humans to Mars: Fifty Years of Mission Planning, 1950-2000 (NASA SP-2001-4521) by David S. F. Portree. A complete PDF version of Monograph 21.
http://history.nasa.gov/
Humans to Mars is also available to be downloaded by chapter. The low-res version is best for Web viewing. The hi-res version is best for printing.
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Please don't shoot the messenger.
There is a lot of information available and often numbers are thrown around without a reference to what they mean or the background that surrounds them, like $300B - $500B to go the Moon, or was that to the Moon, Mars and for a space station. Was it for a 10 year or 20 year or a 30 year time span?
And today, when you add up what NASA is going to be getting a year, what would that number equate to if you said it was for 10, 20, or 30 years?
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http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
FY2011 Request: $19.0 billion
FY2010 Enacted: $18.3 billion
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And when we pick our path to space are we going to try to walk all of them at once, or will we take a journey that has a goal with a number of stops along the way? How many times will we get lost and find we are back to where we started before? Do we have a limited budget that constrains us to be efficient in our selections or do we have a patron saint that will leave sacs of coins along the way? Do I have to produce something to earn my keep or can I pick and chose what I want and take as much as I want?
All those questions and more when you start looking at the details and packing your bag. :-)
Thanks for looking up with me.
- LRK -
Web Site: http://lkellogg.vttoth.com/
BlogSpot: http://kelloggserialreports.
Newsletter: https://news.altair.com/
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WHAT THE MIND CAN CONCEIVE, AND BELIEVE, IT WILL ACHIEVE - LRK
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